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Abstract: Ladislav Holy argues in this paper that by virtue of the self-defining character of human 
activities, anthropological interpretation could proceed only on the basis of understanding 
  indigenous categories and analysing activities in terms of those categories; imposition of outsid-
ers ’ analytic categories onto local concerns wouldonly lead to confused analyses and the distorted 
representation of local systems of knowledge.
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I.
Phenomenologically oriented approaches in sociology, of which ethnomethodology1 
seems to be the only one that has passed the stage of programmatic and methodological 
proclamations and has produced empirical studies, derive from the assumption that social 
reality is constructed through people ’ s activities. They treat the manner of the emergence 
of social reality as problematic [see Walsh 1972: 20; Filmer – Phillipson – Silverman – Walsh 
1972: passim] and their main concern is with the ways in which people accomplish their 
social world and in this process of accomplishment make it intelligible, reasonable and 
accountable. It is intelligible and accountable because those who inhabit it share the same 
“common sense knowledge” of it. This concept, which was introduced into sociology by 
the writings of Alfred Schutz [1962; 1964; 1966], is one of the central concepts of eth-
nomethodology. To talk about “common sense knowledge of social structures” [Garfinkel 
1967: 76–77] means to talk about the agreement of the members of society about the social 
phenomena.
With regard to this concept, the main concern of ethnomethodology is again to inves-
tigate the processes through which this agreement is generated: “The study of common 
sense knowledge and common sense activities consists of treating as problematic phenom-
ena the actual methods whereby members of a society, doing sociology, lay or professional, 
make the structures of everyday activities observable.” [Garfinkel 1967: 75]
It is a problem that can best be investigated at the level of face-to-face interactional 
situations or by observing the behaviour of people who have to negotiate what others take 
for granted, which therefore makes it problematic for them (transvestites, lunatics, etc.). 
It is an important and legitimate problem in its own right but a problem of limited meth-
odological implications. Although it throws light on social processes at the inter-personal 
*1 Reprint of the paper first published in 1976 by the Department of Social Anthropology, of Queen ’ s University 
of Belfast, in. The Queen ’ s University Papers in Social Anthropology, Volume 1, edited by Ladislav Holy.
1  Understood here not in the sense given to it originally by Garfinkel [1974: 15–18] but rather as “school” 
regarded as such  by practitioners of “traditional” sociology.  The  practical, professional kriteria, on the basis 
of which it can be considered such a school, were outlined by Turner [1974: 7].10
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or micro-sociological level, it is not directly applicable to the study of macro-sociological 
processes.
Wishing neither to limit ourselves to the study of micro-sociological processes, nor 
to restrict ourselves to the repetition of ethnomethodological exercises on new empirical 
data, our main concern is not with the process of generating people ’ s knowledge in face-
to-face interactions. Our analysis starts where ethnomethodology ends. It starts by taking 
it for granted that to be able to interact, to be able to accomplish successfully their day-to-
day affairs, indeed to exist as social beings at all, people have to possess a adequate knowl-
edge of the society they live in, leaving it to ethnomethodology to investigate the methods 
by which the members of society arrive at it through their practical accomplishments. Our 
concern is to investigate the ways in which people operate the stock of their knowledge 
of the social world in their everyday behaviour in this world, and the ways in which their 
experience of this world generates their sense of it. We are thus concerned with the rela-
tionship existing between people ’ s knowledge of social reality and their social behaviour. 
Delineated in this way, our overall concern is coterminous with the whole sociological or 
anthropological enterprise: the study of actors  ’ knowledge and actors  ’ behaviour is what 
social science is all about, as Milan Stuchlik ’ s paper has clearly indicated.
In this volume, we address ourselves to only a certain aspect of the interrelationship 
between actors  ’ knowledge and their behaviour: our immediate concern is with the ways 
and means by which actors adjust their behaviour in various situations and manipulate 
their behaviour in these situations according to their relevant knowledge. Even if our direct 
problem is limited in this way, it still remains too wide to preclude us from exhausting 
analytically all its implications. It is still too complex to preclude us from abandoning the 
largely unexplicated common sense concepts we employ in describing and analysing the 
ordering concepts and forms of reason of the actors. The following introductory remarks 
are written with a full awareness of these conceptual and logical problems.
The question of what we actually mean by the word “knowledge” and “knowing”, the 
question of what knowledge amounts to, is a subject of ongoing philosophical argument 
and controversy [see e.g. Woozley 1949; Ayar 1956; Findlay 1961]. Without wishing to enter 
into this philosophical discussion, we shall simply mean by knowledge “he certainty that 
phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics” [Berger – Luckmann 
1966: 13].
This certainty is a state of mind. As we cannot enter other people  ’  s minds, and it is 
problematic how far we can understand our own minds, in all inferences about people  ’  s 
knowledge we have to depend on phenomena which can be taken as its manifestations. 
People express their certainty about the reality and character of social phenomena in two 
ways: by displaying behaviour which is in accordance with this certainty and by making 
statements about it. Consequently, two phenomena can be considered as manifestations 
of knowledge: people ’ s verbal statements and their behaviour.
People ’ s verbal statements are problematic as manifestations of knowledge for the sim-
ple reason that these statements are made, and consequently the making of them is in itself 
a special kind of behaviour. This holds true both for “action dispositional” propositions 
and for assertions that simply show knowledge, irrespective of whether these assertions 
are spontaneous conversational utterances or whether they have been elicited as answers to 
researchers ’ questions. Unless they are professional theoreticians, people do not go around 11
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making declarations of their knowledge in everyday life: they declare their knowledge in 
the course of their everyday purposive behaviour. Every verbal utterance, or para-linguistic 
expression of agreement or disagreement, is part of some specific situation of interaction, 
part of the actor  ’ s definition of the situation and part of the impression he tries to create. 
In short, it is determined by the purpose of his behaviour within the situation: it is part of 
his manipulation of the situation. When the Reverend Dr Ian Paisley (leader of Protestants 
during the conflict in Northern Ireland) says that Catholics are not Christians, he does not 
make a simple statement of knowledge. By this statement he defines the conflict of which 
his statement is a part as basically religious, as irreconcilable, etc. He clearly demonstrates 
his position in this conflict, he makes it clear what he stands for and why. In short, his 
statement defines the conflict and his position in it in a specific way.
That it is part of the actor  ’  s manipulation of the situation is only one aspect of every 
statement of knowledge. Its other aspect is that it is, at the same time, determined by the 
situation. Ian Paisley  ’  s statement about Catholics not being Christians not only defines 
the conflict in a specific way; it is in itself defined or determined by the conflict. Being 
a clergyman, Paisley might be expected to make statements on things religious. But that 
of all things religious on which he could have commented, he felt the need to make the 
statement he made, was determined by the overall political situation of Northern Ireland. 
I do not think this point needs further elaboration.
This overall situational determination and manipulative function of every verbal state-
ment imposes certain limits on our treatment of verbal statements as manifestations of 
knowledge. It means, first of all, that we cannot treat social knowledge as something exist-
ing independently of particular situations. From this it does not follow, however, that each 
particular piece of knowledge will guide, and be relevant for, only one particular act. Ian 
Paisley  ’  s knowledge about the non-Christian status of Catholics can be relevant for his 
rejection of ecumenical efforts, for his opposition to integrated education, and probably for 
his behaviour in many more situations. Most knowledge will, in this way, guide other acts 
and will be relevant in a whole range of situations other than those in which it was verbally 
stated. It does not necessarily have to be verbalized in all these other situations. We can 
infer its relevance for them only from the behaviour of the participants in these situations. 
Such an inference is made possible because the knowledge which guides behaviour in the 
situation under investigation has already been verbalized in some other situation, and 
because the observer shares the logic by which the same knowledge can be meaningful 
in different situations. A sociologist working in his own society shares this logic because 
he has learnt it in the process of his socialization and through his practical behaviour as 
a member of his society. An anthropologist working in a foreign society learns this logic 
through living with the people he studies and through the necessity of behaving towards 
them, and thus sharing the same meaning, in the process of his participant observation. 
Anthropological fieldwork means, in this sense, the anthropologist ’ s socialization into the 
culture he studies.
Apart from verbal statements, people ’ s non-verbal behaviour is another source of the 
anthropologist ’ s inferences about their knowledge.2 If we assume that all behaviour is guid-
2  Behaviour  is considered as the  manifestation of knowledge by at least some philosophers [e.g. Ryle 
1949; Strawson 1959; for the problem of action as the manifestion of belief cf. Needham 1972: 98–102]. 12
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ed by relevant knowledge, and is meaningful to others only because the actor and specific 
others share the same knowledge, it follows that by observing behaviour and by accounting 
for it as meaningful, an anthropologist must be able to postulate the knowledge guiding 
this behaviour, even if this knowledge was never verbalized by the actors themselves. If, 
for example, an anthropologist in the course of his fieldwork consistently observes women, 
and never men, handling grain supplies, and men, and never women, milking cows, he can 
infer that the people he studies know that handling grain is women  ’  s work and milking 
cows men  ’  s work, even if they themselves have never made a single remark to this effect. 
In this way he is able to postulate the minimum knowledge which the actors must have to 
be able to perform any act that he has observed and understood as meaningful in the same 
way as the actors themselves and other members of their society.
We have so far been able to formulate the problem of the relation of knowledge and 
behaviour in a typically tautological way: people ’ s knowledge of social reality guides their 
actual social behaviour, and their social behaviour, both verbal and non-verbal, is the man-
ifestation of the knowledge they hold. The relationship between knowledge and behaviour 
is a dyadic relationship and the knowledge behaviour dyad is a closed, self-explanatory unit 
of social reality. Our basic assumption is that all behaviour derived from a certain knowl-
edge is valid within this unit and at the same time adequately explains it. As far as the par-
ticular piece of behaviour is concerned, the particular piece of knowledge is its adequate 
explanation. To return to our previous example, when Ian Paisley says that Catholics are 
not Christians, we may naturally ask whether he knows or believes that Catholics are not 
Christians and then ascertain that he does, because his demonstration at an ecumenical 
conference in Dundalk derived from this knowledge: he went to protest against frater-
nizing and compromising with non-Christians. Having established what his knowledge 
is (both from what he says his knowledge is, and from his non-verbal behaviour in some 
situations) and having observed his behaviour in other situations, which is consistent with 
his knowledge, what can we actually say about the relationship between his knowledge and 
his behaviour? We can say that his behaviour at the ecumenical conference is accountable 
for by his knowledge about the non-Christian status of Catholics. It is accountable for in 
this way by other members of society, that is, it is accountable for on the level of common-
sense reasoning. If this were the only level of explanation to consider, all anthropological 
enterprise would be reduced to reporting people  ’  s behaviour and the knowledge which 
guides it. It would be reduced to the level of common sense.
Although the problem of the relationship between knowledge and behaviour has 
been, of necessity, formulated in a tautological way, it does not follow that, apart from 
formulating the basic assumption about the relationship between knowledge and behav-
iour, no meaningful statements can be made about it. To be able to make them, we have 
to conceive of the relationship not as the relationship between one particular piece of 
Those who reject behaviour as the manifestation of knowledge base their argument on truth as the 
criterion of knowledge (Knowledge is a true statement of facts). They argue that we cannot tell what 
a man knows by observation of his behaviour because  his  behaviour does  not settle the question of 
truth: that can only be established independently of that particular  man ’ s behaviour [see e.g. Powell 
1967: 64–72]. As the intersubjective meaning  of any knowledge, and not its correspondence  with 
any “objectively” established truth,  is relevant for people ’ s  social  behaviour, this objection can be 
disregarded.13
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knowledge and one particular piece of behaviour, but as a relationship between one par-
ticular piece of knowledge guiding some particular behaviour and deriving from some 
wider knowledge. This means that one particular knowledge  behaviour dyad is taken as 
a unit of investigation and related to the knowledge from which it derives, that is, we 
must investigate what makes the existence of the dyad possible and of what it is a sys-
tematic part. While the investigation of the dyadic relationship between one particular 
piece of knowledge and the behaviour deriving from it in various situations concentrates 
on the statement of knowledge as its manifestation, the investigation of the relationship 
between the dyad and the wider social knowledge that makes its existence possible, con-
centrates on another aspect of the statements of knowledge. It concentrates on the mak-
ing of these statements, that is, it treats them as one specific aspect of behaviour that 
needs to be explained. To illustrate this with our example: what is now problematic is 
not the content of Ian Paisley  ’  s statement, but why he, of all people, made that state-
ment and why he made it at that particular time, in that particular place, and to that 
particular audience. In other words, the problem is to establish what is the knowledge 
of social reality that enables Ian Paisley to make the statement about Catholics not being 
Christians and to act accordingly, and that enables him to make it under circumstances 
under which he did make it. This problem is legitimate, as in this particular instance we 
are dealing with just one portion of Ian Paisley  ’  s total stock of social knowledge; and 
although at common-sense level it explains one or several particular instances of his 
behaviour, it is itself, in a different context, yet another particular instance of behaviour 
requiring explanation. It can be explained by making explicit both his theological and 
political knowledge. Naturally, the whole process of explanation does not have to end 
up with making explicit this level of knowledge. It is again possible to treat the making 
of statements of this wider theological and political knowledge as particular instances 
of behaviour and ask again what makes this behaviour possible. This particular process 
of explanation enables us to explain more than behaviour in isolated social situations 
and knowledge relevant for particular situations. It is the main methodological device 
that enables us to analyse not only face-to-face interactional situations but to analyse 
and explain quite complex macro-sociological processes. Milan Stuchlik  ’  s analysis of the 
system of Mapuche land tenure employs this methodology. In his study he treats the con-
temporary system of land tenure on Mapuche reservations, and the rules and norms of 
interpersonal claims and obligations which legitimize it for the Mapuche themselves, as 
a social reality emergent from the Mapuche knowledge and interpretation of a set of lim-
iting conditions brought into existence by the Chilean conquest. It was their knowledge 
of these limiting conditions that made it necessary to adapt the rules of land tenure, and 
the concomitant Mapuche knowledge and behaviour, so as to be consistent with it. This 
process of analysis and explanation enables us to conceptualise social reality as a system 
whose component parts are not interrelated and interdependent social forms, but social 
processes. It is a system of integrated social knowledge, or of rules that people possess for 
their behaviour in the social world, for the manipulation of social reality, and for making 
this social reality meaningful.
When treating statements of knowledge as one particular instance of behaviour, we 
are in fact treating claims to knowledge, or the making of statements about knowledge, as 
instances of behaviour. They are significant data in two respects.14
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Firstly, they are the basis of the anthropologist ’ s inferences about the actors ’ knowledge 
of social reality, about the vast amount of intersubjectively shared background expectan-
cies, or indeed certainties, that things are what they are. Because the actors take these 
expectancies or certainties for granted, they are hardly ever making them explicit. When 
an actor makes claims to knowledge, that is, behaves in a specific way, he is “responsive 
to this background, while at the same time he is at a loss to tell us specifically of what the 
expectancies consist. When we ask him about them, he has little or nothing to say.” [Gar-
finkel 1967: 36–7]. In many instances they are, metaphorically speaking, the only doors 
through which an anthropologist may enter into the realm of these background expectan-
cies. When a teacher in a session with his students makes claims to a certain knowledge, 
he does this because he and the students know that they live in a world and share a world 
in which there exist specific agreed ways of learning, specific people who teach and spe-
cific others who learn, specific areas of knowledge which are to be transmitted from one 
generation to another, etc. The teacher makes a claim to knowledge because of his and the 
students  ’ knowledge of this reality. It is this intersubjectively shared knowledge of social 
reality that makes any particular statement of knowledge, and for that matter any other 
behaviour, meaningful. When an anthropologist tries to explain why a particular actor 
makes a particular statement of knowledge at a particular time and in a particular context, 
he has to make explicit the actor  ’  s knowledge of social reality from which his behaviour 
derives. The particular statement he is trying to explain, together with other statements 
and behavioural acts of the same actor, and with statements and acts of other actors who 
share the same world, are the sources of his inferences about that knowledge.
Secondly, the statements of knowledge are significant data in that by making a state-
ment of knowledge, an actor is not only manipulated by social reality; he himself manipu-
lates it. He sustains or changes the definition of the situation as it has been agreed on by its 
participants; he sustains or changes his or others ’ roles in the situation; he manages, in this 
way, to be taken by others for what he wants to be taken as. He and all others who partici-
pate with him in the given situation are, in this way, engaged in the creation or recreation 
of social reality. Whether he simulates knowledge when making claim to it, is irrelevant 
in this process. As every teacher will certainly realize, he has to claim certain knowledge 
to sustain an agreed definition of the situation in a tutorial session. All of us have prob-
ably at one time or another simulated knowledge to be able to sustain this definition. As 
far as we have managed to do that successfully, that is, as far as our behaviour has been 
accounted for by the students as following from the intersubjectively shared knowledge of 
the situation, the definition of the situation has been maintained. It was still a tutorial as 
we intersubjectively know it. We could even plead ignorance on certain occasions with-
out changing the definition of the situation. The situation could be sustained because the 
claim to ignorance could be contingently explained: we know that a teacher is a specialist 
in a certain branch of the subject and is not expected to know everything about the sub-
ject. But if the teacher were constantly ignorant of things he is expected to know, and his 
students constantly had knowledge of things they are expected to learn from him, a new 
reality would be constructed and a new knowledge would come into existence. I shall 
return to this point later on.
Although we can assume the existence of the basic stock of common-sense knowl-
edge for every fully socialized member of society, although we can assume that there is 15
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something that “everybody knows”, it does not follow from this that everybody knows 
everything. As Berger and Luckmann put it: “There is always more objective reality ‘ avail-
able ’ than is actually internalized in any individual consciousness, simply because the con-
tents of socialization are determined by the social distribution of knowledge. No individual 
internalizes the totality of what is objectivated as reality in his society, not even if the 
society and its world are relatively simple ones.” [Berger – Luckmann 1966: 154]. There are 
areas of social reality in which an individual does not have adequate knowledge; he may 
experience large sectors of social life as incomprehensible [Ibid.: 78]. He may also lack 
knowledge in and of whole areas of social life. This state of affairs is the consequence of 
the social distribution of knowledge (cf. Schutz), or role-specific distribution of knowledge 
(cf. Berger and Luckmann).
As claims to knowledge are significant data for the anthropologist  ’  s inferences about 
the actor ’ s knowledge of social reality, so are the claims to lack of knowledge. The latter are 
also means of manipulating social reality in the same way as are claims to knowledge. And, 
incidentally, the lack of knowledge guides behaviour, although not exactly in the same way 
as knowledge does. Fallers reports the following incident from Busoga:
N.K. was showing me around his homestead. After looking at the dwelling huts and out-build-
ings, we walked out into a large, well-kept plantain garden and I asked about methods of cultiva-
tion and the different varieties of fruit. N.K. laughed and beckoned to one of his three wives who 
was working nearby. “Oh, one of the wives will tell you about that,” he said. The wives rule the 
plantain garden. (…) I was then shown around the garden by the wife, who pointed out the dif-
ferences, invisible to my untrained eye, between the different varieties and rather proudly showed 
me how to handle the knives used for felling and peeling plantains. All the while, N.K. followed 
along, looking interested and expressing surprise as if each bit of information were new to him. 
This seemed partly a pose, but it clearly indicated to me that in the plantain garden N.K. felt on 
unfamiliar ground. [Fallers 1956: 76]
Fallers generalizes his observations in the following way: “Men say that they know 
nothing about plantains and pretend not to know the distinctions between the different 
varieties suitable for boiling, roasting, beer-making and eating uncooked” [Ibid.]. Both 
from this generalization and from the description given above it is clear that Fallers ’ s view 
is that the Soga men simulate their ignorance of the cultivation of plantains and of their 
various varieties and their uses. Whether they only simulate this knowledge or indeed do 
not know is again irrelevant. What is relevant is that:
1. This lack of knowledge guides their behaviour: for example, that N.K. asked one 
of his wives to supply Fallers with the required information derived directly from N.K.  ’  s 
lack of knowledge, as well as from his knowledge that his wife possessed the required 
information.
2. The claim to the lack of knowledge about the plantain cultivation and use, and the 
behaviour which derives from this lack, derive jointly from N.K. ’ s and other Soga ’ s knowl-
edge that a certain division of labour exists in Soga society, that certain tasks are performed 
by men and others by women, etc.
3. Behaviour that derives from the knowledge that a certain division of labour exists in 
Soga society, one aspect of which is men making claims to the lack of knowledge of plan-
tain cultivation, sustains and thus perpetually recreates the social reality in which the given 16
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division of labour exists. When acting on this knowledge in his interaction with Fallers, 
N.K. defined the interaction in terms of this reality. Were N.K. to provide Fallers with the 
information the latter sought, his behaviour could still be contingently explained within 
the existing reality. It could be said, for instance, that N.K. really did not know anything 
about plantain cultivation but fabricated some story to please an inquisitive anthropolo-
gist. If, however, most Soga men admitted knowledge about plantain cultivation, which 
then could not be contingently explained away, and started to display behaviour deriving 
from that knowledge; if, for example, they became at least occasionally involved in plantain 
cultivation or started giving their wives advice about it, then a new social reality would 
be created, at least to the extent that the rigid rules of the division of labour, according 
to which plantain cultivation is exclusively women  ’  s work and responsibility, would no 
longer be part of it.
It follows from the last point that, by making claims to knowledge and by making 
claims to the lack of it, an individual uses his knowledge to manipulate social reality. He 
uses it to define his status in an interactional situation and to indicate to other participants 
in the situation the reality in terms of which he interacts.
An incident from my fieldwork among the Berti will further illustrate the point, as it 
concerns an interactional situation in which the status of the participants was ambivalent 
and a claim to the lack of knowledge was employed in its negotiation.
On almost every day it was held, I visited a market near the village in which I worked. 
I spent most of my time at the market sitting in the shop of one merchant, Ibrahim, and 
chatting with people who came to the shop. Very often I stayed till late at night and, before 
returning to the village, I had supper with Ibrahim. Sometimes other people were eating 
in Ibrahim ’ s house, sometimes just Ibrahim and I shared the meal. Ibrahim delivered and 
received my mail; if I wanted to go to town, he would organize a lift for me in some mer-
chant lorry that was passing through the market place, and he helped me in many other 
practical ways.
Once I asked him what his lineage was, and he replied that he had not the faintest idea 
and that in any case he did not know anything about Berti lineages. I have not met any 
other Berti man of Ibrahim  ’  s generation who did not know his lineage. Ibrahim claimed 
a lack of knowledge of Berti affairs on several other occasions when I tried to discuss 
with him things I had been discussing routinely with other Berti men. By claiming this 
ignorance, Ibrahim defined the situation of his interaction with me in terms of different 
statuses than those of an anthropologist and a Berti informant by perpetually displaying 
a complete lack of knowledge of Berti affairs. Thus he was able to maintain this definition 
of the situation in which he treated me differently from Berti men and consequently was 
treated differently from them by myself.
II.
I started the discussion by mentioning that people express their knowledge of social 
reality by displaying behaviour that is in accordance with this knowledge and by mak-
ing statements about it. As behaviour is amongst the things about which statements are 
made, there exists a problem concerning the actor ’ s knowledge of his own actions and of 
the actions of others. The whole question of the actor  ’  s knowledge of his own actions is 17
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an epistemological question and does not concern us here. An actor  ’  s knowledge of the 
actions of others is equally an epistemological problem, but also an anthropological prob-
lem. It concerns us directly in its anthropological dimension, i.e., insofar as it enables the 
actor to orient himself in the social world in which he lives. His knowledge of the behav-
iour of others enables the actor to account for that behaviour. When accounting for it, he 
is doing exactly the same as a professional anthropologist is doing: he uses the behaviour 
of others as a manifestation of the others  ’ motives, intentions, and goals, and thus makes 
it meaningful. He can account for it only on the basis of the motives and intentions from 
which it derives and his knowledge of the goals it is supposed to achieve. The process of 
making the behaviour of others accountable for by a particular actor is thus a process of 
confronting it with his knowledge of possible motives, intentions and goals. Only when he 
can account for it in this way, does he know what the other is doing.
Hastings Donnan ’ s paper gives a vivid description of how the white English speaking 
workers in a London factory account for the behaviour of Pakistani workers and make it 
meaningful to themselves in terms of their knowledge of the Pakistanis  ’ motives, inten-
tions and goals. This case is significant in that although this knowledge is intersubjectively 
shared by the English speaking workers, it is not shared by both them and the Pakistanis. 
On the contrary, we can reasonably assume that the Pakistanis  ’ motives, intentions and 
goals are quite different from how they are perceived by the English speaking group. This 
group can in fact maintain its knowledge of the Pakistanis only because it never guides 
their behaviour in any inter-ethnic situation. As Donnan shows, a completely different 
kind of knowledge guides the interaction between members of different ethnic groups in 
the factory. Yet it still holds that when English speaking workers account for Pakistanis  ’ 
behaviour, they make it meaningful in the way in which the professional anthropologist 
makes meaningful the behaviour of the people he studies. The method they use, however, 
is rather like that employed by Harris in accounting for the split in the Bathonga lineage 
(cf. Stuchlik ’ s paper) rather than the one suggested here. This parallel can be extended by 
pointing out that, in both Harris ’ s and the English speaking workers ’ cases, their account-
ing for the behaviour of others can be maintained only as far as it serves to explain the 
behaviour of others to members of one ’ s own group: in one case to the group of profession-
al colleagues, in the other to one ’ s own ethnic group. It cannot be maintained in a situation 
in which the members of the group doing the explaining have to interact with members of 
the group whose behaviour they explain, as the English speaking workers very well know. 
The differences in motives, intentions and goals, as held by one group and as perceived by 
another, would sooner or later lead to a necessary breakdown in any meaningful commu-
nication, as this would become insurmountably problematic.
Before dealing with this problem, I have once again to point out that for most of the 
time the behaviour of others is intersubjectively meaningful as a result of every actor  ’  s 
knowledge of the actions of others. Because of this knowledge, the routine behaviour of 
others in everyday life is accountable for and thus, according to Berger and Luckmann, 
unproblematic [Berger – Luckmann 1966: 37–38]:
(…) the others with whom I work are unproblematic to me as long as they perform their 
familiar, taken-for-granted routines – say, typing away at desks next to mine in my office. They 
become problematic if they interrupt these routines – say huddling together in a corner and 
talking in whispers. As I enquire about the meaning of this unusual activity, there is a variety of 18
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possibilities that my common-sense knowledge is capable of reintegrating into the unproblematic 
routines of everyday life: they may be consulting on how to fix a broken typewriter, or one of them 
may have some urgent instruction from the boss, and so on. [Ibid.: 38]
This kind of “problematic” behaviour can be “reintegrated into the unproblematic rou-
tine of everyday life”, that is, made accountable for on the basis of my existing knowledge: 
for example, I know that typewriters may break down and that broken typewriters are 
being repaired; I know that bosses give instructions; I know that people consult others 
and seek their advice. There does not arise any discrepancy between the behaviour of 
others and my knowledge thereof: I have only to account for the behaviour of others on 
the basis of other knowledge than that which makes their behaviour meaningful to me 
routinely (that is, on the basis of other knowledge than that they are typists working in the 
same office). There might, however, arise a situation in which there will be a discrepancy 
between others ’ behaviour and my knowledge:
I may find that they are discussing a union directive to go on strike, something as yet outside 
my experience but still well within the range of problems with which my common-sense knowl-
edge can deal … [Ibid.: 38]
Provided I do not know about strikes, there arises a discrepancy between my fel-
low-workers  ’ behaviour and my knowledge: the behaviour of my fellow-workers is 
momentarily unaccountable. But it remains as such only temporarily. I can account for it 
as a result of my immediate socialization, as a result of somebody telling me that there is 
going to be a strike, what a strike is, and that my fellow-workers are discussing that strike. 
I can thus account for the behaviour of others as a result of acquiring additional knowledge 
of social reality which I lacked before. Newcomers to the London factory studied by Don-
nan, find themselves in this situation when confronted with an Irishman and a West Indian 
whose mutual behaviour violates the basic rule of conduct in inter-ethnic situations. They 
can account for their behaviour only after they have learnt what everybody else in the 
factory knows: that these two fellow  workers are friends.
Needless to say, an actor can only use additional knowledge that was acquired to 
account for the problematic behaviour of others, if it complements his previous knowledge 
of social reality and does not contradict it. The behaviour of others will remain, for him, 
unaccountable, should there arise between it and his knowledge, a contradiction that he 
cannot overcome either by explaining the behaviour on the basis of some other knowledge 
that he possesses but ordinarily does not employ in accounting for the behaviour in the 
given situation (which is the basis of contingent explanation), or by acquiring additional 
knowledge that would complement his existing stock of knowledge and enable him to 
account for the behaviour he is confronted with. Experiments conducted by Garfinkel  ’  s 
students, in which they were asked to spend some time in their homes imagining that 
they were lodgers and acting out this assumption [Garfinkel 1967: 47–49], provide good 
examples. After the experiments the students reported that:
(…) family members demanded explanations: What  ’  s the matter? What  ’  s gotten into you? 
Did you get fired? Are you sick? What are you being so superior about? Why are you mad? Are 
you out of your mind or are you just stupid? [Ibid.: 47]19
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Explanations were sought in previous, understandable motives of the student: the student was 
“working too hard” in school; the student was “ill”; there had been “another fight” with a fiancee 
… [Ibid.: 48]
These explanations clearly indicate that the family members tried to account for the 
behaviour of their son or daughter on the basis of their existing knowledge; they tried 
to explain it contingently. As offered explanations by family members went unacknowl-
edged by their children, and as the children did not provide their parents with additional 
knowledge on the basis of which they could account for their behaviour (as it was an 
experimental situation, this was only done after the experiment had ended), the contra-
diction between the child ’ s behaviour and the parents ’ knowledge of it had to be resolved 
in a different way. It was resolved by the parents  ’ rejection of the child  ’  s behaviour. In 
Garfinkel ’ s words:
(…) there followed withdrawal by the offended member, attempted isolation of the culprit, 
retaliation and denunciation. “Don  ’  t bother with him, he  ’  s in one of his moods again”; “Pay no 
attention but just wait until he asks me for something”; “You ’ re cutting me, okay, I ’ ll cut you and 
then some”; “Why must you always create friction in our family harmony” (…) “I don ’ t want any 
more of that out of you and if you can ’ t treat your mother decently you ’ d better move.” [Ibid.: 48]
Obviously because of this rejection of their behaviour by the family members the stu-
dents found their assignment difficult to complete [Ibid.: 49], or, in some cases, it was not 
successful in the sense that the family treated it as a joke or refused to be concerned with 
it [Ibid.: 47]. The reason why the children  ’  s behaviour was rejected was that the children 
did not give, in their behaviour, any clues on the basis of which the parents could inter-
pret it: the students did not react to explanations of their behaviour by their parents. The 
latter, thus, could not apply the documentary method of interpretation [Garfinkel 1967: 
77–79] or that property of interpretative procedure which Cicourel calls the “retrospec-
tive-prospective sense of occurrence” [Cicourel 1973: 54] to their children  ’  s behaviour 
and thus account for it. As the parents could never learn during the experiment that their 
children were trying to behave as lodgers, the situation remained defined, for the parents, 
in terms of parent-child statuses. Within this situation the children ’ s behaviour could not 
be accounted for. To reject it was the only possibility left to the parents.
To reject behaviour is one possible way of resolving a contradiction between knowledge 
and behaviour, but short of cases in which people go suddenly mad, I cannot imagine 
its empirical existence in non  experimental situations. Even in a number of experimen-
tal situations that Garfinkel analyses, the subjects of the experiment did not reject the 
experimenter  ’  s behaviour, but rather used their existing knowledge to account for it. For 
example, from the ten undergraduates who underwent the experiment “to explore alter-
native means to psychotherapy as a way of giving persons advice about their personal 
problems” [described in. Garfinkel 1967: Ch. 3], “none (…) had difficulty in accomplish-
ing the series of ten questions and in summarizing and evaluating the advice”, i.e. none 
rejected the experimenter  ’  s behaviour. When the random answers to the subjects ques-
tions appeared nonsensical, contradictory to the previously given answers and so on, the 
subject interpreted them by reformulating what he assumed to be the context of meaning 20
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he held in common with the experimenter. This tendency to treat behaviour as meaning-
ful, albeit possibly in some other “game”, follows from the necessity of behaviour being 
intersubjectively meaningful if social life is to exist at all, and from everybody  ’  s recogni-
tion that all behaviour is “normally” meaningful. When a discrepancy between behaviour 
and knowledge arises, which cannot be reconciled on the level of existing knowledge (i.e. 
contingently explained), the knowledge that behaviour is “normally” meaningful militates 
against its rejection: behaviour is meaningful, therefore the behaviour in question must 
be meaningful. The only possibility then is to adapt or adjust the existing knowledge to 
account for the behaviour. The alteration of genealogical knowledge among the Berti illus-
trates this process.
Among the Berti, the resolution of conflicts by payment of financial or material com-
pensation to the injured party is the only situation in which kinship groups act corporately; 
by their behaviour in this situation, the participants clearly proclaim their kinship posi-
tions. By his behaviour in the situation each individual manifests his own kinship position 
and his kinship tie to the offender. For example, among agrabun, who usually comprise the 
descendants of four paternal and four maternal great-great-grandfathers, no compensation 
is ever paid for damage to property: it is not asked for.
Muhammad Usman married a great-granddaughter of Dudu, and since his marriage 
he has lived uxorilocally in her village inhabited by members of the Dudu lineage segment. 
His married son Abdullahi Muhamad lives there too. The members of the Dudu segment 
are his agrabun, and when their cattle damage his fields or his cattle damage their fields 
compensation is not paid. His father ’ s brother ’ s son, Abdullahi Hamadun, moved after his 
father ’ s death into the village of Muhammad Usman, where he married and set up his own 
household. Although the descendants of Diidu are not his agrabun, he refused to accept 
even a part of the offered compensation when their cattle caused damage to his fields, as 
did Abdullahi Muhammad, his father  ’  s brother  ’  s son. Thus he started to behave towards 
the members of the Diidu segment as towards his agrabun and accordingly they did not 
accept compensation from him when his cattle caused damage in their fields. Abdullahi 
Hamadiin  ’  s behaviour, which was indicative of his close kinship links to the members of 
the Dudu segment, was in contradiction with the knowledge of his genealogy. This con-
tradiction was nullified by the adjustment of the genealogical knowledge to account for 
the existing behaviour. Today, Abdullahi Hamadun is considered by members of the Dudu 
segment to be a direct descendant of Dudu.
I recorded elsewhere other instances of the changes in genealogical knowledge caused by the 
need to account for the conduct of people who, according to the existing knowledge of their gene-
alogical position, behaved differently from the way they should have done in conflict situations 
involving material compensation. [Holy 1974: 137–142]
This explanation of a change in genealogical knowledge is only a partial explanation, 
what remains to be explained is why the behaviour changed in the first place, as each 
Berti  ’  s behaviour, in every situation of conflict resolved by the payment of financial or 
material compensation, is guided by his knowledge of his own genealogical position. This 
determines whether or not he will participate in the payment of compensation, what will 
be the size of his contribution if he participates, and, if he is the injured party, whether 21
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or not he will be entitled to compensation and from whom, whether or not he will accept 
an offered compensation, etc. For example, conflicts between individuals from maximal 
lineages other than his own do not affect him at all. In a conflict between a member of his 
maximal lineage and a member of another he is forced to take an active part in the resolu-
tion, and the manner in which he is involved is determined by his kinship to the offender. 
For example, if he is one of the offender  ’  s agrabun, his contribution to the compensation 
is bigger than that of the members of the offender ’ s lineage who are not his agrabun. The 
full list of these rules is given elsewhere [Holy 1974: 130–134]. They are only a part of what 
every Berti knows about behaviour in conflict situations requiring material compensation; 
and they are only a fraction of his total corpus of knowledge.
Every Berti also knows that the closeness or distance of kinship which binds him to his 
kin defines the extent of his economic, political, ritual, and other obligations to them and 
the extent of their expectations from him. At the same time, he knows that the extent of 
his duties and expectations, by which he is bound to those kinsmen with whom he lives in 
close spatial proximity and interacts frequently, is greater than it would be if he was not in 
daily contact with them. Thus, if he did not live in their village, Abdullahi Hamadfin would 
behave towards the members of the Dudu segment as he would ordinarily behave towards 
his father  ’  s brother  ’  s affines. But because he lives in their village, and because they are 
spatially his closest relatives, his behaviour towards them is much more intimate. When he 
refuses compensation from any member of the Dudu segment, his behaviour is not guided 
by his knowledge of the rules governing behaviour in conflict situations requiring material 
compensation. It is guided by his knowledge that the members of the Dudu segment are 
his only relatives around and he must treat them as such. He thus decides in which of the 
two possible “norm games” he is going to play. For anybody else than Abdullahi Hama-
dun and the member of the Dudu segment whose cattle trespassed on Abdullahi  ’  s field, 
Abdullahi  ’  s behaviour is meaningful only as behaviour in a situation calling for material 
compensation. But, because he refuses compensation, there arises a discrepancy between 
his actual behaviour and the knowledge about his genealogical position. To be able to 
account for his behaviour requires an adjustment of the knowledge: his behaviour can 
be accounted for only as behaviour between two agrabun; he comes to be considered as 
a direct descendant of Dudu.
The possibility of choice between two or more systems of norms, or norm games 
applicable to the same situation of interaction, is probably the main mechanism for the 
manipulation of society by an individual, and at the same time the main process gener-
ating the discrepancy between knowledge and behaviour. This arises whenever people or 
things consistently do not behave according to any available expectation or definition. 
The following adjustment of knowledge which leads to the redefinition or to the change 
of expectations is the main process through which knowledge changes and probably the 
main process through which new patterns of behaviour emerge.
It might seem that any methodological approach that insists on explaining an actor  ’  s 
behaviour as deriving from his knowledge, and which explicity eliminates the anthropolo-
gist ’ s knowledge as a legitimate source of explanation of the actor ’ s behaviour, necessarily 
reduces the anthropologist ’ s role to that of a journalist/reporter or at best an ethnographer. 
This would certainly be so if all that was needed for recording the actor ’ s knowledge was to 
record his voluntary statements about social reality and to elicit other statements from him 22
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in the form of answers to the observer  ’  s questions. This would be a sufficient procedure 
for getting at an actor  ’  s knowledge of social reality if that did not amount to more than 
the sum total of statements he makes, or is able to make, about it. But it should be clear by 
now that the concept of an individual ’ s knowledge of social reality, as I have been using it, 
also comprises that part of what he knows which he never needs to verbalize and probably 
is not even able to verbalize. The anthropologist  ’  s task, before he can do anything else, is 
to establish what this knowledge amounts to. Peters  ’  s study of the blood feud among the 
Bedouins of Cyrenaica is illustrative here.
The Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica are divided into primary, secondary and tertiary sec-
tions. When a member of one tertiary section is killed by a member of another, the imme-
diate killing in vengeance is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and both 
killings are recognized as having cancelled each other out.
When a member of one secondary section kills a member of another, the immediate 
killings in vengeance is taken to be just one in a long series of killing constituting the blood 
feud. When a member of one primary section kills a member of another, the near kinsmen 
of· the dead raid the camp of the culprit and an armed conflict ensues between the members 
of both sections [Peters 1967: 262–269]. This generalized picture based on the verbalization 
of the Bedouins themselves (what Peters calls their “conscious model”) might be taken for 
what the Bedouins know about the blood feud and for what the blood feud meaningfully 
is for them. This knowledge guides their behaviour in situations of blood feud. But it does 
not help any individual Bedouin to decide whether or not he finds himself in a situation of 
blood feud when, after a member of his own section has been killed, he meets a member 
of the killer ’ s section. If the latter is, for example, his near matrilateral kinsman, he will not 
kill him. He has thus decided that, in this case, the situation of blood feud does not obtain 
and he defines the situation as something different. He makes this decision on the basis 
of his knowledge of various situational factors. When asked about them, he probably “has 
little or nothing to say”, in Garfinkel  ’  s words. This is not only because he takes them for 
granted, but because in verbalizing them he would have to give a recital of almost the total 
stock of his social knowledge. If the anthropologist then presents his account of the blood 
feud, which differs from the conscious model of the Bedouins in that it includes at least 
the most important or usual situational factors that define whether blood feud obtains at 
all, it does not mean that he is accounting for it as an institution of a system of which the 
Bedouins themselves are unaware and ignorant. He arrived at his account of the blood feud 
from observation of the actual instances of individual feuds, and of instances of abstention 
from the feud. To be able to perform them or to abstain from them in the way in which the 
anthropologist observed them, the Bedouin had to know not only about the feud but also 
about the factors which define any situation as one of feud or non-feud. His knowledge 
had to be the same as that which the anthropologist employs in making his account. This 
account is then an account of the Bedouin knowledge.
Not only the Bedouin  ’  s but every person  ’  s total stock of knowledge consists basically 
of two kinds: knowledge of how to behave in a given situation, and knowledge of how to 
define a situation. These two kinds of knowledge derive from the dialectic relationship 
between man and society. His knowledge of how to define a situation is the knowledge by 
which he manipulates social reality, in the sense that he perpetually creates or recreates 23
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it. His knowledge of how to behave in a given situation once it has been defined is, on the 
other hand, the knowledge through which he is being manipulated by society: through this 
knowledge his behaviour is socially determined.
The fact that different knowledge is applicable to different situations permits the empir-
ical existence of a seemingly paradoxical state of affairs when people manage to negotiate 
unproblematically their everyday interactions while holding simultaneously knowledge 
that is obviously contradictory. The analysis of this problem is a central theme of Hastings 
Donnan ’ s paper and an important theme of David Riches ’ paper.
Donnan shows how the white English-speaking workers in a London factory are able 
to explain the behaviour of coloured immigrant workers in overtly ethnic terms, while at 
the same time interacting with them seemingly on the basis of the knowledge that ethnicity 
does not matter. They achieve this through being able to define the possible situations of 
interaction within the factory as either ethnically closed or ethnically open, and having 
them so defined, through adhering strictly to the rules of interaction appropriate to these 
respective spheres.
Similarly, Riches shows how the Eskimo in a small arctic Canadian settlement know 
simultaneously that the Canadians do a good job in helping the Eskimo, and that they 
are bastards who should go back south. The local Canadians equally hold a contradictory 
knowledge of senior officials in the regional administrative centre. As far as the latter 
are concerned, the Canadians in the settlement maintain that they are slowly but surely 
working in the right direction for the benefit of the Eskimo, and at the same time blame 
them for maintaining no liaison between various departments and for having no idea at 
all of the real situation in Eskimo settlements. Riches not only points out how all this con-
tradictory knowledge is situationally determined, but goes one step further in his analysis 
and explains how the local Canadians  ’ contradictory knowledge of their bosses in the 
administrative centre is generated through the ongoing interaction between the former 
and the latter.
Both papers demonstrate that socially available knowledge is not a perfectly integrated 
system; there are many instances of contradictory knowledge being held. Moreover, the 
total stock of knowledge available to any individual is different, due to the unique char-
acter of his biography, from the knowledge available to any other member of his society. 
The knowledge every individual possesses is determined by his position in the society in 
two ways: in the sense that, due to his specific social position, he has no access to certain 
knowledge, and in the sense that his position in society, if it is to be sustained, has to 
be corroborated by corresponding knowledge. Here again, the stock of socially available 
knowledge is determined, for each individual, by his position in society. The corollary of 
this social determination of each individual  ’  s stock of knowledge is the process where-
by, claiming a certain knowledge or the lack of it, an individual manipulates his social 
position: by claiming or disclaiming knowledge adequate for his position, he either sus-
tains its previous definition or changes it. Only by treating the problem of the relationship 
between knowledge and behaviour within the overall framework of this dialectic relation-
ship between man and society, can we grasp people ’ s knowledge in all its possible aspects: 
as a guide for practical behaviour, as a means of accounting for behaviour, as a tool for 
manipulating social reality and as a thing which itself is the object of manipulation.24
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